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Probability Errors:
Some Positive and Normative Implications for Tort and Contract Law
Eric A. Posner1

Abstract. This paper examines the effect of tort rules on behavior if people are optimistic
or insensitive relative to true probabilities. The paper shows that under certain conditions
both strict liability and negligence cause levels of care that are higher than, or equal to,
what is efficient (rather than lower). The paper also shows that under certain conditions
strict liability and negligence cause the same level of activity among optimists (more than
is efficient). Other implications for tort law are discussed, as are the sensitivity of the
results to the choice of how to model probability errors. Implications for contract law,
and some normative issues, are also discussed.

Evidence from experiments and empirical studies suggests that people make
systematic errors when they estimate probabilities. The exact nature of these errors
remains controversial, but two themes are that people discount low probability events,
treating them as though they occur with a probability of zero, and that, more generally,
people are insensitive to small differences between probabilities. The first bias might
cause a homeowner to treat the probability of a remote event like an earthquake as though
it were equal to zero; the second bias might cause a person to divide potential accidents
into a small number of categories—high, medium, and low. I will follow the literature
and call the first problem one of “optimism,” though, as we shall see, this term is
imprecise; and I will call the second problem one of “insensitivity.”
Legal scholars think that optimism and probability insensitivity justify additional
regulation because optimists will take too little care. If the driver of an automobile
believes that the risk of an accident is zero, he will drive too quickly. But the truth turns
out to be more complex. A person who discounts remote risks might take too much care,
rather than too little. By increasing his level of care incrementally, the person can reduce
1
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his perceived probability of an accident nonincrementally, from some positive amount to
zero. If the perceived reduction in expected accident costs exceeds the cost of the
additional care, the person will use more care than is efficient, and this is true regardless
whether the legal rule is strict liability or negligence.
This result holds as well for people who suffer from probability insensitivity.
Even if they do not treat low probability events as though they would occur with
probability of zero, they will enjoy large perceived benefits when they can take a small
amount of additional care in order to move the risk of an accident from the “high”
category to “medium,” or “medium” to “low.” The existence of discontinuities or
inflexion points in probability functions plays havoc with intuitions about the relationship
between the law and decisions about care level.
This paper explores these and other implications of optimism and insensitivity for
the law.2 The focus (Part I) is on optimism and tort law. My other main result is that
sufficiently optimistic agents engage in the same level of activity under strict liability and
negligence; by contrast, rational agents engage in more activity under strict liability than
under negligence. The reason for this difference is that the optimistic agent under strict
liability and the rational agent under negligence do not internalize accident costs when
they take due care (or what they think is due care). I also discuss the difference between
harm-sensitive and harm-insensitive optimism; the relationship between optimism and
probability insensitivity; and the implications of optimism for bilateral accidents. Part II
briefly discusses optimism and contract law, and Part III contains some general
comments about the treatment of probability errors in normative law and economics.
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I.
A.

Probability Errors and Tort Law

Summary of Analysis

Suppose that agents are rational except that they are optimistic about low
probability accidents. When they engage in some behavior like driving, they know that
their behavior creates a risk of harm. When choosing the level of care, agents know the
actual probability of harm associated with each level of care when the probability is
above some threshold; below that threshold the probability of harm, which is low but
positive, is treated as though it were zero.
Intuition tells us that such an agent would take too little care, whether the tort
regime is strict liability or negligence. The analysis will show that for sufficiently high
levels of optimism, the agent might take too much or too little care. The effect that causes
too little care is the discounting of harms: the agent underestimates expected liability for
a high level of care, and so will take less care. The effect that causes too much care is that
the agent can cause a (subjective, that is, error-driven) reduction of expected liability by
taking a small amount of additional care. If the agent takes some level of care that causes
a perceived positive probability of harm, and if a small additional amount of care would
cause that probability to drop from the threshold amount to zero, then the agent will think
that he is, in effect, taking a small extra precaution that will eliminate all potential
liability. Which of the effects dominates depends on the relationship between the
probability distribution, the level of harm, and the care function. Optimism could cause
an agent to think that a bad event will not occur, or that a little extra care will have a
dramatic effect on the probability of a bad event occurring.
In addition, for sufficiently low levels of optimism, the agent will take the optimal
care, and this amount of care is invariant with respect to the amount of optimism below a
threshold. The agent does not take too much care because the amount of care necessary to
create zero perceived expected harm is greater than the sum of the cost of optimal care
and the correctly perceived expected harm. The agent does not take too little care because

3

at the optimal level of care an accident is risky enough to be accurately anticipated by the
low-optimism agent.
A well known result in the literature is that for unilateral accidents, strict liability
and negligence have the same effect on care, but different effects on the level of activity.
Strict liability causes the efficient level of activity; negligence causes too much activity.
However, the difference between the two rules nearly disappears when the agent is
optimistic. Both rules cause too much activity; indeed, unless the risk is sufficiently
remote, the two rules cause the same level of inefficient activity. The reason is that under
both regimes the optimistic agent will treat remote events as though they do not occur,
and so the main difference between strict liability and negligence—namely, that under
negligence the agent is not liable if he takes due care—disappears in the agent’s mind.
Next, I show informally that the results can hold even under less extreme
assumptions about probability misestimation. The factor that drives the results is not the
possibility that people could treat certain probabilities as though they were zero, but the
possibility that people have trouble thinking of probability distributions as smooth or
continuous functions and divide lower and higher probability events into discrete groups.
Finally, I argue that for bilateral accidents the different effects of strict liability
and negligence on rational individuals carry over to the case of optimism: both rules
cause the injurer to take care but only negligence causes the victim to take care.
However, under both rules the level of care taken by injurer and victim will not be
optimal. As for activity level, the different effects of strict liability with contributory
negligence, and negligence, on rational individuals do not carry over to the case of
optimism. Strict liability with contributory negligence encourages rational victims but not
rational injurers to engage in too much activity; negligence encourages rational injurers
but not rational victims to engage in too much activity. By contrast, the two rules have
the same effect on optimistic injurers and victims, encouraging both groups to engage in
too much activity.

4

B.

Analysis

1.

Level of Care

Let: x = level of care (normalized, so x is also the cost of care); p(x) be the
probability of an accident, as a function of the level of care (p'(x) < 0; p"(x) > 0); h =
harm. For illustrative purposes, we assume that p(x) = x–2. For simplicity harm is a
constant: the agent controls only the probability of the harm occurring.
The total (that is, social) cost function, TC = x + x–2 h. The optimal level of care
x* = (2h)1/3.
Strict liability will cause the agent to choose x*; negligence will cause the agent to
choose x* if (for example) the agent must pay h if x < x*. Figure 1 illustrates these
standard results.3
[Figure 1]
Now we want to ask what happens if the agent has an irrational probability
function pi(x), where
pi(x)

= x–2

if p(x) > p

=0

otherwise.

The value of p refers to the floor below which the probability of the accident is so small
that the agent treats it as if it were 0.
Corresponding to p is a level of care, x', which is the threshold between levels of
care associated with accurate probability assessments and levels of care associated with
optimistic probability assessment. To determine the value of x', we must first make an
additional assumption about whether the agent’s optimism is sensitive to the level of
harm or not. Consider the driver of an ordinary truck and the driver of a tanker truck
3
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filled with gasoline. One could imagine that each driver is equally insensitive to a low
probability accident for a given level of care x, where p(x) < p , but one could also
imagine that the driver of the tanker is more sensitive. In the first (harm-insensitive) case,
pi(x) = x–2 if p(x) > p , so x' = (1/ p )1/2. In the second (harm-sensitive) case, pi(x) = x–2 if
p(x) > p /h, so x' = (h/ p )1/2. I will assume that optimism is harm-sensitive, which seems
more realistic, but will briefly discuss the harm-insensitive case in Section I.B.3.
The agent will minimize TCi = x + pi(x)h. There are two separate cases to
consider. First, if p is sufficiently low, and thus x' is sufficiently high, the agent will
choose xi = x*. The reason is that the level of care necessary to reach x' is higher than the
combined care and accident costs for x*. Think of a driver who believes that he can
reduce the probability of an injury to zero only by driving a Volvo but the ownership cost
of a Volvo is greater than the joint cost of owning a Honda and expected liability from an
accident. The driver will not buy the Volvo but will buy the Honda and take efficient
care.
Second, if p is not too low, and thus x' is not too high, xi = x'. This is the case
where the ownership cost of the Volvo, and thus the illusory sense of never being liable,
is less than the combined ownership and expected accident costs of the Honda.
To find the dividing line between the two cases, one sets the cost of the
“irrational” level of care that generates illusory expected zero liability (Volvo) equal to
the joint care and accident costs for rational care (Honda): TC(x') = TC(x*). Because
TC(x') = x' (the expected accident cost is zero), we have: x' = (h/ p )1/2 = TC(x*) = (3h)1/3 /
22/3. Simplifying:
xi =

x*

if p ≤ 24/3h1/3 / 9 ≈ 0.27 h1/3

x'

otherwise

If we limit ourselves to the second case, where xi = x', then we can ask whether xi is
greater than or less than x*. Setting xi = x*, we get p = h1/3 / 22/3 ≈ 0.63 h1/3. It turns out
that it could be either.
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If p < 0.63 h1/3, then xi > x*.
If p ≥ 0.63 h1/3, then xi ≤ x*.
Thus there are three regions:
Table 1
Low Optimism

Moderate Optimism

High Optimism

p ≤ 0.27 h1/3

0. 27 h1/3 < p < 0.63 h1/3

0.63 h1/3 ≤ p

xi = x*

xi = x' > x*

xi = x' ≤ x*

Optimal Care

Too Much Care

Too Little Care

In the first region, the probability threshold (where the agent treats the probability
of the event as though it were zero) is so remote, that the agent would need to incur a lot
of care in order to reach it. Because the cost of care is so high, the agent would prefer
choosing the level of care that minimizes the “rational” total cost function. This is the
example where the agent buys the Honda rather than the Volvo.
In the second region, the probability threshold is not so remote, so the agent finds
it worthwhile to take extra care in order to reduce expected accident cost from a positive
amount to an amount he perceives as 0. See Figure 2. The optimal level of care while
driving is, let’s suppose, a good night’s sleep and driving during the day; but the agent
thinks that if he does these things and buys antilock breaks he will never have an
accident. He takes too much care because the extra precaution creates the illusory sense
of no expected liability.
[Figure 2]
In the third region, an inefficiently low level of care is sufficient to reach the
probability threshold, and the agent has no incentive to take additional care. See Figure 3.
The agent thinks that a good night’s sleep is sufficient to reduce the probability of an
accident to zero; therefore, he does not bother confining his driving to the day.
[Figure 3]
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Figure 4 shows care as a function of optimism. For low levels of optimism, care is
x*. Above p = 0.27 h1/3, care is a declining function of optimism.
[Figure 4]
Negligence. We have assumed strict liability, but what about negligence? If the
agent assumes that courts will set the level of due care at xi rather than x*, then the results
remain the same. The agent will take too little care or too much care, depending on p
and h. Thus, the agent has the same care incentives under strict liability and negligence.
But there is another possibility. If the agent believes that the court (irrationally!)
will insist on setting the due care level at x*, then the agent’s behavior under negligence
and strict liability will differ but only in the midlevel optimism case. In the latter case, the
agent will prefer to incur the cost of optimal care x*, rather than too much care, x',
because x* < x'. Under negligence, the agent does not bear expected accident costs if he
takes level of care x*, so he gains nothing by increasing the level of care to x'.
2.

Activity Level

Now suppose that the agent can choose his level of activity. Let s = level of
activity, and u(s) equal the agent’s level of utility from engaging in a certain level of
activity (u'(s) > 0, u"(s) < 0). Then the utility function is: u(s) – sx – sp(x)h = u(s) – s(x +
p(x)h). The agent maximizes utility by minimizing the value of the negative expression,
which means choosing optimal care x*; and then by choosing an activity level s* that
maximizes utility given the per-unit joint cost of care and expected liability.4
Using our earlier probability function, p(x) = x–2, it follows that utility is
maximized if x* = (2h)1/3 (minimizing the negative expression) and if s* is such that u'(s)
= (2h)1/3 + ((2h)1/3)–2h = (3h)1/3 / 22/3.

4
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Now let us look at the agent’s incentives if he uses optimistic probability
estimates.
Strict Liability
The agent will choose s and x to maximize u(s, x) = u(s) – sx – spi(x)h. Recall that
if p is low enough, the agent will choose xi = x*. Otherwise, the agent will choose xi = x'.
Let us consider the two cases separately.
In the first case, where the agent chooses xi = x*, the agent internalizes the
expected harm, and thus acts the same as the rational agent. Thus, he chooses si = s*.
In the second case, where the agent chooses xi = x', the agent’s utility function is,
in effect, u(s) – sxi. The reason is that at xi = x', the agent treats the probability of the
accident, and thus the expected accident cost, as though it were zero. Thus the agent will
choose si such that u'(s) = xi = x' = (h/ p )1/2. Intuitively, the agent will choose si ≥ s*,
because the only internalized cost of his activity is the level of care, and not the expected
accident cost.
Proof. In the second case the agent chooses xi = x' because he has more than low
optimism: p ≥ 0.27 h1/3. Manipulating the inequality, we get (h/ p )1/2 ≤ (3h)1/3 / 22/3. The
left side of the inequality is u'(si), and the right side is u'(s*), as we saw above. Thus u'(si)
≤ u'(s*). Because u"(s) < 0, si ≥ s*.
This shows that the optimistic agent will engage in too much activity as long as
p is not too low. The reason is that he will simply not take account of some of the cost
(low probability harms) that he inflicts on others. For arbitrarily low values of p , the
agent will engage in the optimal level of activity. Thus, for a sufficiently broad
distribution of p , strict liability results in too much activity.

9

Negligence
Under negligence, the rational agent will choose s and x to maximize u(s) – sx.
Thus, he will choose s* to maximize u'(s) – x*. Because the agent does not internalize the
expected cost of accidents if he takes due care, he will engage in too much activity.5
The optimistic agent will choose s and x to maximize u(s) – sxi, where, as before,
we assume that the agent believes that the court will apply xi as the standard of care. In
the low optimism case, where xi = x*, the agent will act the same as the rational agent and
choose si = s*.
In the second case, where xi = x', the agent will choose si to maximize
u(s) – p –1/2. Thus, the agent will choose the same high level of activity as under strict
liability.6
We can summarize the results as follows. (1) When the agent is sufficiently
optimistic, strict liability and negligence will have the same effect on activity. When the
agent’s optimism is at a low level, strict liability produces efficient activity and
negligence produces too much activity, just as they do for the rational agent. (2) Under
strict liability and negligence, the sufficiently optimistic agent might engage in too much
care as well as too little care (xi could be greater, less than, or equal to x*), and he will
engage in too much activity (si > s*). The point is that if the agent treats low probability
events as though they will not occur, he will (usually) act like a rational agent under a
negligence regime, where no liability is attached to careful behavior that causes expected
harms.

5
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3.

Level of Harm

It is clear from Table 1 that the level of harm will affect the chances that the agent
will take the optimal level of care, or too much or too little. As harm increases, the agent
is more likely to take the optimal level of care; more likely to take too much care; and
less likely to take too little care. It is worth mentioning that one would get a different
result if one assumed harm-insensitive optimism. The analogous table is:
Table 2
Low Optimism

Moderate Optimism

High Optimism

p ≤ 0.27 h–2/3

0. 27 h–2/3 < p < 0.63 h–2/3

0.63 h–2/3 ≤ p

xi = x*

xi = x' > x*

xi = x' ≤ x*

Optimal Care

Too Much Care

Too Little Care

Now, as harm increases, the agent is less likely to take the optimal level of care; more
likely to take too much care; and more likely to take too little care.
The optimal level of care increases with harm. The harm-insensitive optimist will
not internalize the increase in harm, while the harm-sensitive optimist will internalize it
partially. This is why an increase in harm will cause the harm-sensitive optimist to act
more efficiently than the harm-insensitive optimist.
Figure 5 shows care as a function of harm. The curve labeled x*(h) depicts
optimal care rising at a declining rate with the level of harm. The curve labeled xi(h)
depicts irrational care. Note that it matches x*(h) at high levels of harm; otherwise it is
too low or too high except when the curves cross. The curve labeled xii(h) shows harminsensitive care, which of course is a horizontal line, invariant with respect to h, except at
high levels of harm.
[Figure 5]

11

Figure 5 also shows how courts, in theory, could adjust awards in order to give
efficient incentives to optimists. Focusing on the harm-sensitive case (the court can’t
affect the behavior of the harm-insensitive agent except at high levels of harm), where the
level of harm is roughly in the middle of the x-axis, the court could provide efficient
incentives either by reducing the award or by increasing the award. If the award is
reduced, the agent will take a level of care that is optimal for a rational agent but below
optimal for the optimist. If the award is increased enough, the agent will be thrust into the
region of the midlevel optimist, and act as though he were rational. This result holds in
the region of midlevel optimism (where xi(h) and x*(h) cross on the left, and join on the
right). At a higher level of optimism, the court should increase the award; at a lower level
of optimism, the court does not need to adjust the award.
4.

Generality: Alternative Probability Distributions

One objection to the analysis so far is that the assumed probability distribution (or
class of probability distributions) is implausible. It does not seem likely that when a
person drives a car, he accurately estimates the probability of an accident as long as he
takes little care, but then when his care exceeds a threshold, he then inaccurately thinks
that the probability of an accident is zero. Indeed, the evidence for optimism is mixed,
and other evidence suggests that in some settings people overestimate the probability of a
small harm.
However, my results do not depend on people believing that low probabilities are
zero or even that they optimistically underestimate probabilities. My results can hold
even if people are pessimistic, and overestimate the probability of a small harm. The
necessary assumption is only that people are insufficiently sensitive to probabilities.
One might think, for example, that the agent’s subjective probability could be a
step function. The agent thinks that for a range of lower care behavior the probability of
an accident is the same high number; for a range of medium care behavior the probability
of an accident is the same middle number; and for a range of low care behavior the
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probability of an accident is low, though not necessarily zero. It remains the case that the
agent could take too much or too little care. Too little care is easy to understand; too
much care will occur as long as the perceived drop in probability occurs soon enough
after the optimal level of care, that the decline in expected accident liability is greater
than the increase in the cost of care. Thus, the result does not depend on a discontinuous
probability function, just on the function having at least one inflection point and a
sufficiently steep slope soon after the optimal level of care. Nor does the result depend on
optimism; the tail of the step function (for example) could be higher than the tail of p(x).
One other possibility is that people are optimistic, but that the optimism does not
affect the slope of the objective probability function. Formally, pi'(x) = p'(x) and pi(x) <
p(x) for all x. If p(x) is a linear function, for example, then pi(x) would be just a parallel
line that is below p(x). This assumption might seem to be the most natural, but it is
inconsistent with the literature, which suggests that people are more likely to be wrong
about low probability events than about high probability events. But even if we accepted
this assumption, it has an interesting and unintuitive result, namely, that the agent would
take the optimal level of care (neither too much nor too little) under both strict liability
and negligence. The reason is that the marginal benefit of care remains the same if the
slope does not change. Thus, the current tort system provides the correct incentives for
care (although not for activity level) even if agents are optimistic.
5.

Bilateral Accidents

Suppose that the victim as well as the injurer can reduce the probability of an
accident by taking care; thus p(x, y). If both agents estimate probabilities correctly, then
strict liability produces less efficient levels of care than negligence does. Both rules cause
the injurer to take optimal care; but full compensation under strict liability gives the
victim no incentive to take care. Negligence, by contrast, makes the victim bear the cost
of his own carelessness when the injurer takes due care but the accident occurs anyway.7

7

See Brown, supra note __; Shavell, supra note __; Landes & Posner, supra note __.

13

Now suppose that both parties are optimistic. As we saw before, the injurer will
take the same level of care under both rules. Putting aside for the moment the level of
care, the first thing to see is that the effect of the two rules on the victim remains the
same: the victim will have no incentive to take care under strict liability, and will have
such an incentive under negligence. Now returning to the question of level of care, the
injurer could take too much or too little care; the victim under the negligence regime will
also take too much or too little care, both because the victim himself is optimistic, and
because the victim’s choice will be affected by the inefficient level of care chosen by the
injurer.8
As to the question of activity level, for rational agents strict liability with a
defense of contributory negligence causes victims to engage in too much activity;
negligence causes injurers to engage in too much activity.9 For sufficiently (midlevel or
high level) optimistic agents, under both rules victims and injurers will engage in too
much activity. For strict liability with contributory negligence, the injurer will act as
though he were governed by a negligence rule and not internalize accident costs above xi.
For negligence, the victim will act as though he will not incur accident costs above yi.
Thus, the two rules have the same behavioral effects, and the choice between the rules no
longer matters.
C.

Insurance and Redistribution

The argument so far illustrates some of the complex implications of probability
estimation error for care and activity level. Here, I will briefly point out its implications
for insurance and redistribution, focusing on optimism.
If people underestimate low probability events, they will buy too little insurance.
But if they are optimistic, they might take too much, rather than too little, care. For
8

There are interesting variations that one could consider: suppose that victims are rational and mistakenly
think that the injurer will choose x* rather than xi. Or that the victims are rational but understand that
injurers will choose xi. One could also assume that the injurer is rational but the victim is optimistic, and so
on.
9
Shavell, supra note __.
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example, rather than putting in too few smoke detectors because he is heavily insured, a
homeowner might put in too many smoke detectors in order to reduce his perceived
probability of a serious fire to zero. An uninsured optimist, then, might face less risk of
fire than an insured person who is rational.
Jolls argues in a different context that optimism can justify redistributing wealth
through the tort system.10 Because people underestimate low probability events,
redistributive tort awards will distort neither their care nor their labor/leisure choice, and
so will have a less negative effect than high taxes, which people can anticipate more
easily and which distort their labor/leisure choice. In terms of the model, Jolls argues that
the award should be h + t, where t is the transfer, when the defendant is wealthy.
The problem is that increasing the award from h to h + t will distort behavior. To
see why, look at Figure 5, and imagine that h is the midpoint of the x-axis. The optimist’s
level of care, xi(h) is already too high, and xi(h + t) would be even worse. The court could
produce optimal care by reducing the award by some amount r, such that xi(h – r) =
x*(h). Although there are cases where a positive transfer, t, would also reduce the
distortion, Figure 5 provides no reason to think that awarding t is anything but arbitrary,
and in any event shows that redistributive tort awards can distort the behavior of
optimists.
II.

Some Comments on Probability Errors and Contract Law

The argument so far has implications outside tort law. Consider the following
model of contract law. At time 1, Seller and Buyer enter an incomplete contract for the
delivery of a good. Buyer has valuation, v. At time 2, Seller chooses a level of care, x. At
time 3, Seller either performs or pays damages, d. Seller’s cost is either 0 or, with

10

Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1653
(1998). Jolls’ argument, as she acknowledges and discusses, depends on some assumptions, which are in
my view questionable: that the stochastic loss won’t be converted into a certain (small) loss through
insurance, and that a “tax lottery” is not politically feasible.
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probability p(x), a high amount c, where c > v. We suppose that the market is competitive
and Buyer pays a price π equal to Seller’s expected cost.
If transaction costs were zero and the parties could enter a complete contract, they
would agree that Seller will take a level of care x* that minimizes the joint cost of care
and loss to the Buyer (v – π) that results if Seller does not perform. That is, x* solves min.
p(x)c + x. Buyer pays price π = x* and earns a return of v – x*. Seller obtains a return of
0. If transaction costs are positive and the parties cannot enter a complete contract that
specifies x*, then the optimal level of damages is v – π, that is, expectation damages,
which cause Seller to choose x*.11
Suppose now that both Buyer and Seller are irrationally optimistic and think that
the probability distribution is pi(x). The analysis is the same as in the tort case. A
complete contract would specify xi, which could be greater or less than x*; if the contract
is incomplete and expectation damages is the remedy, the same result will be achieved. In
addition, people will enter too many contracts because they will discount losses caused
by low probability events (as before).
Suppose instead that Seller is rational at the time that he enters the contract but
expects that he will be optimistic when he chooses x. If a complete contract is possible,
he will want to include a provision requiring him to choose x* (and will hope that
renegotiation is not possible at time 2). But verifiability problems will often prevent such
a course of action: a court might not be able to determine x*. Another possibility is to
agree to liquidated damages. If the Seller expects to choose xi < x*, then he will want low
liquidated damages; if he expects to choose xi > x*, then he will want high liquidated
damages. The reason is that liquidated damages can be used to shift the pi(x)h curve up or
down, in such a way as to cause the optimistic Seller at time 2 to choose x*. This shows,
contrary to much of the literature, that the existence of cognitive biases is not necessarily

11

Cooter and Ulen, supra note __.
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an argument for the penalty doctrine. Parties might agree to high liquidated damages in
order to blunt the effects of optimism.12
III.

Welfare

In welfare economics, it is conventional to assume that the goal of the state is to
maximize social welfare, which is some aggregation of the individual utility functions of
all citizens.
Suppose that an agent prefers driving a car to taking a bus, but only because he
underestimates the probability of a car crash. Should the state tax car driving in order to
make the agent act the same way as he would if he knew the correct probability of the car
crash? The legal literature answer this question positively, and a positive answer was
implicitly assumed in the analysis in Parts I and II of this paper.
But the problem is more complex. To see why, consider the simplest case.
Suppose that an agent engages in some activity that can injure only himself, and no one
else. He is an optimist, and ignores the small chance that the activity will injure him.
Suppose the government now mandates a precaution that reduces the low probability of
an injury to zero. The agent will perceive this mandate as a cost, with no offsetting
benefits. Therefore, his utility will decline, and so will the social welfare function. A
welfare-maximizing government would therefore not impose what otherwise would seem
to be a sensible mandate.
The problem also occurs in the more general tort case, whenever victims are
optimistic. High tort awards designed to counter the wrongdoer’s carelessness will not be
experienced as an ex ante gain by the victim, and will not affect the victim’s behavior.
The insights of cognitive psychology—especially those relating to biases in perception
and risk estimation—are not easily reconcilable with welfare economics, and thus cannot

12

Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law And Psychology: A Reply To Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious
Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739 (2000).
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be straightforwardly imported into normative law and economics. Many normative
proposals made by authors writing within “behavioral law and economics” fail to address
this problem.
This is not to say that the problem is insoluble. But solving it requires a
conception of welfare different from the conception used by economics. One could
imagine that welfare is objective in the sense that regardless of one’s preferences one has
less welfare if one unknowingly takes high risks than if one does not. Or welfare could
involve not just having any preference, but the right kind of preferences, and when a
person’s preference for driving is not sufficiently informed, that preference does not fully
count in the person’s welfare. But these are difficult and complex problems that have not
been resolved by economists and philosophers.
Conclusion
The most important methodological point I want to make is that when one tries to
operationalize the insights of cognitive psychology, and make them useable for law and
economics, one must make certain specific assumptions about the shape of probability
functions, and terms like “optimism” are too vague to be of help. A person who
underestimates low probability events might be called an optimist, but he also might be
called a pessimist (in certain ranges) about the likelihood that more care will avoid
accidents. The pessimist about care might act the same as the optimist about liability. The
paper has explored various ways that probability errors can be formalized, and their
implications for tort and contract law.
The paper also has some testable empirical implications. One might use
psychological exams to test for optimism, and then see whether optimistic people take the
same level of care under strict liability and under negligence, or whether optimistic
people are more likely to take too much care under both rules than nonoptimistic people
are. The model also allows for indirect tests of optimism: if people are harm-sensitive,
then they should take the optimal level of care when harm is low, higher levels of care
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when harm is moderate, and lower levels of care when harm is high. Indirect tests like
these would be difficult, and open to multiple interpretations, but they might be a useful
way for avoiding the problem of measuring optimism.
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